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T
his  paper  reviews  the  impact  of  the  economic  crisis  on  the 
community development industry. Specifically, it asks, how are 
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) faring? 
What trends are emerging? What steps are CDFIs taking to respond 
to the crisis? In addition, the paper offers “best practices” to help all 
CDFIs manage this difficult climate. To answer these questions and to 
learn from our CDFI peers, we conducted a series of eleven interviews 
with leading CDFIs across the country.2 A number of common themes 
emerged, from heightened portfolio risk and decreased liquidity, to the 
need to develop new skills such as how to implement an effective loan 
workout.
CDFIs can survive this economic crisis and deepen their mission, 
despite the extraordinary difficulty of the current period. CDFIs are the 
first responders in neighborhoods across the country and for families 
hardest hit by the downturn. CDFIs have created an industry joined 
together by a common mission of providing opportunities for people 
and places left out of the economic mainstream. The CDFI network can 
create the strength for CFDIs to help one another through these times, 
and to ensure not only that the field survives, but that it thrives.
Avoiding Denial—What Is the Impact of the 
Economic Crisis on Community Finance?
Heightened Risk
In general, all CDFIs reported heightened risk in their portfolios and 
particularly in housing loans, whether they were national, regional, 
local, large, small, rural or urban. The severity of risk varied consider-
ably by portfolio concentration and by size. Those with high concen-
trations of housing, particularly homeownership projects, reported far 
greater risk. Eight of the ten CDFIs with sizable housing portfolios saw 
homeownership projects as a primary source of increased risk. In par-
ticular, respondents reported that unsubsidized homeownership loans 
were experiencing the greatest weakness.
Heightened risk was evident in increased delinquency rates, or an 
increase in loan extensions, or increases in loan loss reserves, and 
occasionally in all three. Two respondents reported no loss reserve 
increases. The others reported some increase in reserves, generally by 
25 percent to 50 percent. One CDFI with a large exposure to hom-
eownership reported a tenfold increase in its annual provision for loan 
loss reserves. 
The second most frequent cause of growing risk was dependency on 
fundraising or public subsidy (reported by five of eleven CDFIs). One 
CDFI reported a full stop on new loans that depended on fundraising.
Smaller  CDFIs  reported  less  portfolio  deterioration  than  larger 
CDFIs. Respondents saw short-term acquisition and predevelopment 
loans as more risky than long-term loans for projects already in service 
and seasoned, especially community facilities. Portfolios with greater 
concentrations in Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) projects 
experienced  greater  risk.  One  CDFI  avoided  portfolio  deterioration 
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its portfolio. Projects in weaker markets, such as those in 
rural or exurban areas, were affected more than in strong 
markets. 
Geographically, western CDFIs saw more trouble than 
others.  Several  national  and  regional  CDFIs  reported  a 
concentration of problems in California. They reported en-
during slow payment on loans and deep financial stresses 
on community developers. The strains in California CDFI 
portfolios  extended  beyond  housing  and  homeowner-
ship to health care facilities, charter schools, and other 
community facilities. One CEO feared that the affordable 
housing delivery system would be permanently weakened 
because many community developers would not survive 
the  current  economy.  One  national  CDFI  reported  the 
weakness in its portfolio was concentrated in Los Angeles, 
Florida, and in rural locations. 
Although  community  facility  portfolios  seem  to  be 
holding steady at present, many leaders said they were 
waiting for “the other shoe to drop,” and foresaw trouble 
in this sector in the near future, as well as in their commer-
cial portfolios. One respondent predicted the commercial 
and facility loans “will be the second wave.” 
Need for Patience
Most  CDFIs  (nine  of  eleven  respondents)  called  for 
greater patience as borrowers scrambled to put resourc-
es  together  to  make  deals  work.  “Everything  is  taking 
longer,” one respondent said. “Borrowers are going mul-
tiple rounds to get financing and subsidy, at the state and 
city level.” Some leaders reported that their delinquen-
cies were stable because they simply extended loans, be-
lieving that the borrower would eventually work out the 
problems. One CDFI reported extending 80 percent of its 
housing loans (up from 50 percent in more normal times). 
Another reported that they had always experienced many 
extensions, but “now it is for bad reasons.” In part because 
of this growing need for patience as projects came togeth-
er, all but a few CDFIs were anxious about investor renew-
als and serious liquidity issues that affected their ability to 
finance new requests. 
Serious Liquidity Problems
Liquidity shortages were felt broadly, but large CDFIs 
were particularly affected. Six of eight large or rural CDFIs 
reported current and often severe liquidity problems, or 
concern about future liquidity problems. Smaller CDFIs 
fared better as well as those located in the Midwest. All 
but  one  CDFI  expressed  concern  about  a  contracting 
capital environment, even if they were managing well at 
present. Respondents also noted the need for extensions, 
the lack of new capital coming into the field, and concern 
about capital renewals. Indeed, one CDFI leader said, “If 
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Photo Credit: Charlotte Fioritobanks don’t start lending again at reasonable rates, a lot of 
us will go out of business.” Another said that their capital 
partners were “really hunkered down. They’ve begun to 
understand that this is a structural adjustment and they 
need to figure out the new normal.” 
Many of the CDFIs that experienced strong growth in 
deployment during the past two to three years were more 
likely  tapped  out  of  capital  than  those  with  growth  in 
the past year. On the other hand, CDFIs that had not ex-
panded their lending volumes appeared to be faring better 
than others with respect to liquidity. In the case of faster-
growing CDFIs, recent high-volume levels had consumed 
much of their available capital and the need to extend 
loans was causing a capital crunch. Nearly all CDFIs re-
ported  difficulty  in  getting  new  capital  and  sometimes 
renewed capital. Most reported “just making it,” by saying 
no to borrower requests. Some indicated that the liquidity 
problems were being offset by reduced demand. Others 
reported  that  demand  had  increased  in  recent  months, 
largely from the contraction of lending by banks.
CDFIs  reported  mixed  experiences  with  investor 
renewal of capital. In general, they were “holding steady” 
with capital levels, but new capital was virtually impos-
sible to find. One CDFI reported negotiating with a bank 
for more than two years and being on the cusp of a capital 
commitment, only to find the bank taken over by another, 
and the verbal commitment nullified.
Housing Loans Are Hardest Hit
As noted above, most CDFI leaders reported that in-
creased  risk  came  mainly  from  the  housing  portion  of 
their portfolios, particularly from for-sale housing. “Ho-
meownership,” said one respondent, “is clearly most se-
verely impacted. It is head and shoulders above the others 
in weakness. If ten deals are in trouble, seven will be in 
for sale/homeownership. However, our community facili-
ties are fine.”
Community  facilities  (charter  schools,  child  care 
centers, health care centers, water and sewer systems, and 
other community centers) seemed to be performing well, 
particularly if the financing was long-term and for a facility 
already in service. That said, a few saw future trouble in 
their community facilities portfolios, assuming hard times 
spill over into the next year. CDFIs with loans in California 
reported more concern about community facilities proj-
ects than others.
Three CDFIs continued to experience strong customer 
demand, particularly when the CDFI was involved in fi-
nancing community facilities or commercial lending. As 
one respondent said, “There is a ton of demand right now. 
Our phones are ringing off the hooks.” Her organization, 
she said, was “moving upstream” and taking on deals pre-
viously done by banks. Most leaders, however, and par-
ticularly those concentrated in housing, had seen demand 
slow  dramatically  during  the  past  few  months  largely 
because of the uncertainty of public support, the collapse 
of the LIHTC market, and state or local budget issues that 
made new projects too dicey to undertake. The reasons 
given for slower volume included: housing developers re-
maining on the sidelines, waiting for property values to 
bottom out; housing developers are financially weaker, 
because they are paying the carrying costs of unfinished 
projects over longer periods of time as total project fi-
nancing is assembled; lack of capital supply is forcing 
demand to contract; lack of public subsidy to fund new 
projects; homeowners remaining on the sidelines because 
of uncertainty over their employment future, despite the 
low cost of housing.
How Are CDFIs Responding?
In general, CDFIs are responding to the need for pa-
tience by extending loans (nine of eleven respondents) 
where an extension did not cover up a credit problem. 
All CDFIs but one reported notable increases in extended 
loans. The result is a liquidity crunch that often forces 
CDFIs to dial down positive responses to new requests. 
CDFIs are managing heightened risk through a com-
bination of extra vigilance toward late payments, bulking 
up loss reserves (nine of eleven respondents) and, in a 
few cases, performing stress tests on portfolios and cor-
porate budgets. Many CDFIs are scrutinizing deals more 
closely,  along  with  asset  valuations,  and  occasionally, 
reappraisals of portfolio collateral. Most reported higher 
scrutiny of transactions at the front end, in light of the risk 
environment. 
The most common risk management strategy is paying 
greater attention to late payments. CDFIs are making calls 
to customers within a few days of the due date, and are 
escalating if payments are not received. The second and 
third  most  widely  used  approach  to  mitigating  risk  is 
paying extra attention to borrowers’ financial condition 
and scrubbing of asset valuation. CDFIs are also perform-
ing stress tests on borrower projections, looking at levels 
of borrower liquidity to determine size of loans, as well as 
imposing tighter terms and conditions. 
Nearly all CDFIs reported 
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The community development financial sector’s biggest 
asset is its commitment to a shared vision and an indus-
try structure that does not require competition for vitality. 
The economic crisis calls on this asset more than ever. The 
field will need the strength and insights of everyone to pull 
through this extraordinary time. Several leaders noted that 
if the crisis goes on for more than a year, it would create 
serious hardship for the industry. One CDFI leader said, 
“Philanthropy needs to hear that 2010 is a watershed year 
for CDFIs and other nonprofits dependent on multi-year 
grants. 2011 is not survivable without continuing support. 
We may watch the silent demise of nonprofits.”
Many  CDFI  leaders  called  for  new  ways  of  com-
municating and sharing, for creating united fronts en-
dorsing common positions on critical issues, especially 
capital requirements. To get through this crisis, the field 
will need to pull together more closely than in the past. 
The watchwords for the next several years will be: learn, 
share, and help. 
Steps to Weather the Storm
Navigating the worst economy in a century will require 
that members focus on ensuring that the field is as secure as 
possible and able to continue to attain its goals and sustain 
its mission. This requires a number of proactive steps:
Batten Down the Hatches 
During any crisis, it is important to identify one’s soft 
underbelly and protect it, rather than waiting for problems 
to arise. Although some CDFIs are reporting no dramatic 
increases in delinquency rates, they are anticipating prob-
lems and are rescoring their portfolios, increasing their 
risk  reserves,  and  scrutinizing  new  requests. These  are 
perfect initial steps.
Now is the time, as well, to begin stress-testing at the 
organizational level. How much of a revenue decrease 
can  the  organization  withstand?  What  would  happen 
if grant support declined by half? What happens if ten 
percent of the organization’s portfolio is nonperforming? 
The goal is to identify in broad strokes the magnitude of 
potential problems and to develop responses for the back 
pocket if bad news is forthcoming. In the end, the actual 
steps an organization takes may be quite different. But 
there is nothing quite as reassuring to a leader as thinking 
through how bad it might get, identifying the soft spots, 
and developing contingency plans.
Workouts and Foreclosures
For many CDFIs, loan workouts are a rare event. Al-
though projects often hit bumps in the road, the ability 
to  be  patient  and  responsive  to  borrower  requests  has 
often been the main ingredient for a successful workout. 
However, conditions have changed markedly in the past 
twelve months. Good workout and restructuring are spe-
cialized  skills.  In  the  best  circumstances,  they  can  be 
a tool to enhance borrower strength and capacity. Few 
CDFIs,  however,  can  afford  to  bring  on  special  asset 
managers. Yet all CDFI lending staff can learn the special 
skills of a workout situation. One of the hardest things to 
balance is when to exercise speedy and decisive action 
over simple patience. A second difficulty is how to com-
municate in a manner that helps the customer understand 
why the workout is the best course, particularly if wishful 
thinking is at play about the project’s future chances.
In any event, it is worth considering whether an indus-
try wide response is warranted. This could take the form 
of a shared approach to workouts and restructurings, or 
training for lending staff. At the highest level, an industry 
response might also include a “bad bank” where CDFIs 
could create liquidity from their underperforming assets 
while transferring them to specialized expertise to help 
customers get through these difficult economic times.
Our Borrowers, Ourselves
Policy matters. CDFIs are frequently lagging indicators 
of the overall economic environment. Although borrowers 
are on the frontlines, the field can be shielded from im-
mediate impact by borrowers’ coping strategies: they use 
their own cash to feed projects or fundraising shortfalls, 
they lower operating expenses to cover debt service pay-
ments, and so forth. However, if the economic downturn 
is both deep and protracted, these coping strategies will 
be temporary. Ultimately, the health of CDFIs depends on 
the financial health of its customers. 
Many CDFIs are witnessing the deteriorating condi-
tions of community developers and human service orga-
nizations. The withdrawal of public safety net services and 
the contraction of philanthropic support pose a special 
challenge to the CDFI agenda. Raising a strong voice to 
advocate for the community development agenda is more 
important now than ever before, and the message must 
be about the resources that not only benefit CDFIs, but 
also their customers. LIHTC, Section 8, and Community 
Development  Block  Grants  are  examples  of  programs 
central to the community development agenda, but less 
The community development financial 
sector’s biggest asset is its commitment 
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else, supporting the advocacy agenda of community de-
velopment will protect borrowers and the CDFI field in 
the coming years.
Never Waste a Crisis
Use the basics to grow stronger. It is worth repeating 
the basics of sound fiscal and organizational management. 
There is nothing complicated or fancy about these prin-
ciples. They are rooted in everyday common sense. Ironi-
cally, several of the high-flying financial institutions that 
crashed in the current bust violated these fundamentals.
To keep it simple, there are three financial manage-
ment principles that matter most: net worth, liquidity, and 
net operating income margins. Of the three, net worth or 
equity is most important. There are only two ways to create 
net worth: through annual surpluses or attracting equity 
and capital grants, for example from the Financial Assis-
tance program from the CDFI Fund or the Capital Magnet 
Fund. Sufficient liquidity requires CDFIs to manage cash 
to cover at least one year of upcoming liabilities (although 
management textbooks say the ratio should be 2:1, for 
CDFIs, 1:1 is a must). Keep 90 days of operating expenses 
in cash as well. In terms of net operating income, always 
budget a surplus. A four to eight percent net operating 
margin has proven to be a good range. This is the cushion 
that allows budget estimation mistakes and revenue rever-
sals to be absorbed without eroding net worth.
Other Best Practices
Other  best  practices  include  full-cost  accounting, 
ongoing forecasts of annual and multiyear performance, 
and scenario planning. These are techniques that support 
financial security.
Full-cost accounting: Full-cost accounting aligns the 
expenses attributable to an activity or program with the 
revenue the program generates. It requires properly al-
locating management and general costs (overhead). Full-
cost accounting is the basis for understanding which activ-
ities cover their costs, which create surpluses, and which 
require discretionary resources. This allows management 
to make rational and deliberate decisions about which ac-
tivities to expand and which to shrink.
Scenario planning: Create high-, medium-, and low-
risk scenarios for each annual planning cycle. This can 
seem like make-work, but it is crucial. If nothing else, 
scenario planning forces thought about the assumptions 
beneath annual plans, and programs are stronger for it. 
Moreover, the financial aspect of scenario planning can 
reveal  weaknesses  and  assumptions  that  alert  manage-
ment to issues they must tackle. Using worst-case sce-
narios in the present climate forces us past our natural 
denial and disbelief. In the end, worst-case planning can 
spark new ways of looking at an organization and point to 
creative solutions to existing problems. 
Ongoing  projections  of  fiscal  performance: A  disci-
pline often overlooked is preparing year-end projections 
with  each  financial  statement.  Similarly,  multiyear  sce-
narios (three to five years) should be refreshed annually as 
part of the planning cycle.
The Network Solution: Sharing Our  
Way through This
CDFIs  form  a  national  network  dedicated  to  a 
common vision of community development and poverty 
alleviation. On a daily basis, however, the field operates 
separately, with little sharing of services, operations, or ex-
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Photo Credit: Ethan Pinesof mirrors,” where each CDFI creates independently the 
systems and expertise needed to run its business. Each 
enterprise is largely on its own in addressing problems 
and challenges. The result is increased overhead and inef-
ficiency. The field’s survival and future health depends on 
greater efficiency and cost savings. In these most difficult 
of times, the field needs everyone’s ideas and cooperation.
 
CDFI  leaders  identified  five  pressing  needs  for  the 
future:
(1) Equity support. The top priority for CDFI leaders 
was the need for additional equity and protective capital 
during the down cycle. This could take the form of equity 
grants,  loan  loss  reserve  grants,  possibly  even  equity 
equivalent  loans.  Many  equity  bases  are  stretched  by 
credit deterioration at precisely the moment CDFIs need 
to  be  patient  with  customers. Additional  equity  would 
mitigate  this  and  permit  more  mission-driven  behavior 
rather than “hunkering down.” As one organization said, 
“there’s no sense of being a CDFI if we can’t push mission 
in a down time.” 
(2) Liquidity relief. A near tie for first place was the 
need  for  additional  liquidity.  Although  the  need  is  for 
additional liquidity, many also made the point that the 
price must be reasonable so that CDFIs could earn spread 
income. The strategy for this may well be joint advocacy 
for additional resources for the CDFI Fund, for renewed 
capital  commitments  from  banking  partners  and  foun-
dations,  or  increased  capital  commitments  through  the 
current regulatory reform discussions. There was interest 
in  innovative  new  legislation,  such  as  the  Opportunity 
Finance Network sponsored “CDFI bond” program. Like-
wise, several leaders reflected the concern that founda-
tions with program related investments (PRIs) and banks 
with loans to CDFIs were not responding flexibly with 
capital renewals or extension in the face of extraordinary 
financial circumstances. They pointed to a need to join 
together to influence investors.
(3) Workout/troubled asset relief. Several organiza-
tions asked for a centralized workout service that they 
could call upon in dealing with the troubled loans in their 
portfolios. This could take the form of a “bad bank” to 
purchase troubled loans and recapitalize CDFIs. A second 
approach would be to provide expertise that CDFIs could 
call upon for help with their most troubled loans.
(4) A  forum  for  self-help.  Every  organization  inter-
viewed called for additional opportunities to learn from 
one  another.  Some  were  hopeful  things  will  improve 
soon; others felt there was more darkness to come. Never-
theless, all organizations called for increased communica-
tion and sharing of best practices, resources, and informa-
tion. A few called for new models of shared services to 
improve operating efficiency. One leader asked for “vol-
unteers from banks who are workout/trouble asset special-
ists.” Another asked for help in developing sophisticated 
liquidity models and processes. Most called for stronger 
advocacy within policy circles. 
(5) Policies for new resources. Central to CDFI-specif-
ic policy work are the CDFI Fund appropriations debate, 
funding the Capital Magnet Fund – included with an $80 
million  allocation  in  President  Obama’s  budget—and 
funding of the New Markets Tax Credit program. 
In addition, the importance of the upcoming Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act debate cannot be overstated. CDFIs 
need to be a strong voice in this debate, advocating for 
increased resources for communities. In fact, the Oppor-
tunity Finance Network is developing ideas for building 
CDFIs directly into the fabric of regulatory reform as a 
“must do” for financial institutions in meeting their com-
munity reinvestment obligations.
Because the future of development finance is intimate-
ly linked to its customers, many of the policy issues af-
fecting those customers will provide ultimate support to 
CDFIs. These include the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
market, Section 8 subsidies, National Affordable Housing 
Trust  Fund  subsidies,  Community  Development  Block 
Grant programs, and a range of education, child care, and 
health care operating subsidies. Providing support to CDFIs 
without shoring up these underlying programs will be only 
a temporary solution. CDFIs could lend critical support to 
their customers when they advocate for increased federal 
and local support for these safety-net programs.   
The field’s survival and future health 
depends on greater efficiency and cost 
savings. In these most difficult of times, 
the field needs everyone’s ideas and 
cooperation.
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